ABSTRACT As illegal access control, privacy disclosure and other threats in vehicular ad-hoc networks become more prevalent, and the importance of safety and privacy protection in vehicular communications grows significantly. The current communication protocols in vehicular communications primarily guarantee infrangibility and unconditional anonymity to achieve security. On board units in vehicular ad-hoc networks form a shared loop called ring signature. In this paper, we propose a dual-protected ring signature algorithm to protect both sending and receiving of a message with secure transmission. We also introduce road side unit-assisted looping to increase ringing probability. The performance of these algorithms is analyzed theoretically and compared with the standard ring signature algorithm in a real vehicle environment. The analysis and comparison results show that the dual-protected ring signature algorithm is superior to the standard ring signature in security, ringing probability, and communication efficiency, and it satisfactorily meets the requirements of secure communication and privacy protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing application of mobile communication technology, especially 4G and 5G technology, in the automobile industry, vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) have become the mainstream of automotive electronics development. Related applications are not limited to the interior of the vehicle, but have expanded to external networks, including Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle to Pedestrian (V2P), and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) [1] - [3] . Some popular applications include vehicle safety services, parking inquiry systems, and car entertainment systems [4] .
Due to characteristics of wireless communications, VANETs are highly dynamic and have diverse topologies, huge network size, complex members and high real-time requirements [5] , [6] . They are more vulnerable to security threats such as forgery, service denial attacks, and eavesdropping than wired networks. Fake traffic information spread by a malicious attacker in a vehicle network may disturb drivers' attention and threaten traffic safety. VANETs are also prone to illegally information collection in an open shared medium. After intercepting many messages in an area, attackers can analyse the information to track the location and movement of the vehicle [7] , [8] . If the authentication and confidentiality of vehicular communications (VC) in VANETs are not protected, driver-related private information, such as license plate, speed, location, and vehicle routing information, might leak. The attacker may steal identity and location information of the vehicle through vehicular communications, and track the vehicle's movement through multiple road side units (RSUs) [2] , [9] . Therefore, security and privacy protection must be an indispensable part in VANETs.
The Ring Signature (RS) technology is used in e-commerce, government campaigns, as well as VANETs research to achieve fairness and security. The RS technology uses a signature algorithm and a verification algorithm to achieve two aspects of security: unforgeability and unconditional anonymity. Suppose the original message is mes, and there are n signer nodes that form a ring. The public key and private key of each signer S i are P ui and P ri respectively. All public keys form a vector L = {Pu 1 , Pu 2 , . . . , Pu n }. The output ring signature is σ . The signature algorithm is not completed until the signature is generated. The verification algorithm verifies whether the signature σ matches the message mes. In VANETs, the current RS-technology is based on the ring formed by vehicles in transportation network topology. To a certain extent, it solves the problem of information authenticity and greatly strengthens VC security [6] , [10] - [13] . The ring in RS is spontaneous, i.e., the actual signer may choose any user information to generate a RS scheme without notifying the selected users. Therefore, the RS generation does not require help from other ring members, but only needs their published public keys.
Unfortunately, the length of RS depends on the number of members. It is clearly inefficient when the number is too large. RS technology has unconditional anonymity, so a real signer can masquerade as other members of the ring [14] , [15] . In addition, when the number of vehicles is small, the constituent RS threshold is not enough, causing prolonged ringing time, slow rate, and small ring. Because vehicles move at high speeds, if the looping rate is not high enough, the vehicle will not be in the network topology before being looped, causing a looping failure. There are different demands for anonymity due to different vehicles and different owners. The sensitivity of information directly leads to the size of the anonymous set, and the size of the anonymous set directly affects the ring rate [9] . In this paper, we propose an improved dual-protected ring signature (DPRS) using an information transmission method and an improved algorithm to achieve dual protection of VANET communications. And we use RSUs to assist vehicles form a ring to improve the RS ringing probability and ensure VC security. Additionally, we verify the DPRS theoretically in correctness, communication efficiency and RS probability. By setting up a real vehicle environment test, we investigate the performance of the DPRS and compared the improved DPRS with a normal RS. This paper is organized as follows. Related works are described in Section II. Section III introduces DPRS. In Section IV, we propose the theoretical verification of the improved DPRS security performance. On the basis of theoretical verification, we set up a real vehicle test to investigate the performance of DPRS in Section V. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The existing research has put forward many kinds of security communication technology in VANETs environment [1] , [8] , [16] - [19] , including authentication technology based on public key infrastructure (PKI) [5] , [20] - [22] and schemes based on identity signature [3] , [17] , [23] - [27] . Some programs focus on improving system performance and communication efficiency, so they combine batch verification [16] - [19] , cooperative verification [28] , [29] or proxy vehicle [30] . Meanwhile others concentrate on privacy protection, and some technologies of one-time key [8] , pseudonym [20] , [31] , [32] or group signature [15] , [33] are used to improve the schemes.
Reference [20] proposed a PKI-based scheme. An ocean of public-private key pairs and corresponding certificates are pre-deployed in the on-board unit (OBU) of each car, taking a large amount of storage space. In order to reduce the storage cost, [21] proposed an ECPP protocol based on the bilinear pairing, which provides two-way authentication between RSUs and OBUs. When RSUs receive a short-term certificate, they will omit retrieving the revocation list to achieve fast switching. But the large amount of computation in the authentication process limits its overall performance. Reference [22] proposed a authentication scheme, RAISE, based on RSU-assisted. It can reduce the security overhead of a PKI-based scheme. However, the RSUs need to maintain a traceability evidence table, causing degradation of performance. Reference [20] applied PKI and anonymous public keys in VANETs to protect the identity and privacy of vehicles and drivers. But it is not real anonymous communication without effectively protecting security and privacy. Accordingly, [5] proposed an authentication protocol combining the chameleon hash algorithm and elliptic curve. It achieves V2V and V2I anonymous authentication with high computing performance, and it realizes conditional privacy protection.
Compared with the schemes based on public key infrastructure, authentication schemes based on identity signature do not need to issue public key certificates and have better performance.
Reference [17] proposed an identity batch verification (IBV) scheme for OBU-RSU communication. It uses identity based batch authentication signature algorithm [24] and are applied successfully in VANETs, which allows RSUs to verify multiple signatures simultaneously. But the IBV scheme relies heavily on anti-jamming devices. Once the devices are compromised and pre-deployed secret parameters are divulged, the whole system will be at risk and cannot meet the privacy requirements of vehicle identity.
References [3] and [27] proposed several schemes based on pseudonyms. Reference [3] proposed an anonymous communication framework in VANETs based on pseudonyms. The framework consists of the generation, distribution and regeneration of pseudonyms. And it uses a distributed optimization algorithm to change pseudonyms. Reference [27] proposed a privacy protection scheme based on software defined network. It resolves the pseudonym distribution problem with bilinear mapping theory. Unfortunately, it needs to change pseudonyms constantly to protect privacy.
References [23] , [25] , and [26] proposed authentication schemes based on group signature in VANETs. Combining with group signature and identity signature, [25] proposed a secure identity authentication scheme in VANETs. It can adapt to high traffic density areas. Reference [23] proposed an anonymous authentication scheme using group signature in VANETs. The scheme has traceability and revocability and can be batch processed. However, the security of group signature scheme is based on the trustworthiness of group administrators. If group administrators are compromised by attackers, the whole group will be threatened by privacy leakage.
Unlike the group signature schemes, RS scheme does not require group administrators. Reference [34] proposed a RS-based privacy protection scheme. RS also protect vehicle privacy by confusing the individual into the group.
Reference [35] proposed a verifiable RS scheme based on Nyberg-Rueppel signature. It achieves revoking anonymity with hash function. The existing simultaneous signature agreements are mostly based on two or three participants [36] . Reference [37] proposed a RS-based multi-party simultaneous signature protocol. It requires internal members to sign sequentially, but not allow them to sign simultaneously. In RS scheme in [38] , signature length is proportional to the number of members and the scheme has inefficiency. Therefore, how to construct a RS scheme with fixed signature length and use it to construct efficient multiparty simultaneous signature protocol has become an open problem.
In addition, there are signature algorithms based on SIS problem [33] , [39] , [40] . Reference [39] proposed a GPV lattice filtering algorithm without non-repudiation. Reference [40] proposed a RS scheme based on the small integer solution (SIS) problem. It contains three important algorithms. Reference [11] constructed an identity based RS scheme composed of three roles: the key generation center (KGC), the signer and the verifier.
In this paper, we propose an improved DPRS in VANETs. We improve the ring efficiency and information security with RSU-assisted looping and safety information transmission system. Then, we compare the proposed scheme with the existing schemes in the aspects of communication security and efficiency.
III. THE OPERATIONS OF PROPOSED DPRS A. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
The Dual-Protected Ring Signature (DPRS) algorithm is introduced in this section. The symbols used in this section are declared in Table 1 and the method of secure message transmission is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The operations of the algorithm are elaborated as follows.
Sending Message: In order to send a message, the sender requests a message password PWD and the corresponding private key P r from the Trusted Agent (TA), and initiates a ring signature for message encryption.
(1) Sender sends an ''Apply-send'' request containing its car_ID to TA.
(2) When TA receives the request, it calls the ID authentication library to verify the security of car_ID.
(3) If car_ID passes the security verification, TA invokes PWD and the private key distribution library, and sends PWD and the private key P r of the message to sender. Otherwise, TA rejects the request.
(4) Sender receives the request reply from TA. (5) If the sender is allowed to send the message, it initiates DPRS (detailed in part B of this section) in its transportation network and obtains the ring signature σ . Otherwise, it cannot send a message.
(6) Sender transmits the encrypted message mes to its network.
Receiving Message: Receiver requests TA to send the password corresponding to the message and verifies the encrypted signature by using its public key. The original message mes is decoded using PWD.
(1) Receiver sends an ''Apply-receive'' request containing itscar_ID or RSU_ID to the TA.
(2) When TA receives the ''Apply-receive'' request, it calls the ID authentication library to verify the security of car_ID or RSU_ID.
(3) If the car_ID or RSU_ID passes the security verification, TA invokes the RS library and sends PWD of the message to the receiver. Otherwise, TA rejects the request.
(4) Receiver receives the request reply from TA. (5) If the receiver is allowed to receive the message, it receives PWD. When it receives encrypted message mes in the network, it verifies the signature with L and its own P u . Only after the signature passes the verification, the receiver will receive the original message through PWD. If the ''Apply-receive'' request is rejected, the receiver cannot receive and decrypt the message.
When multiple messages are transmitted in the network, they can share the same PWD to improve the communication efficiency.
In the information transmission system, the sender can be an on board unit and the receiver can be an OBU or an RSU, as shown in Table 2 . The interrelationship of sender, receiver and TA in the system is illustrated in Fig. 2 . 
B. THE OPERATION OF IMPROVED DPRS
A complete digital signature system is a seven-tuple (M, D, K, K', KGEN, SIGN, VER) [41] . In DPRS, the system is a ten-tuple (M, D, K, K', SET, KGEN, ENCRYPT, SIGN, VER, DECRYPT) consisting of four space algorithms, six polynomial-time algorithms. The regime is listed in Table 3 .
Based on the study in [11] , [42] , and [43] , we improved the RS technique. In conjunction with the secure messaging system in Section A, we present four algorithms in improved DPRS.
SET: Suppose there are n ring signature members (including OBUs and RSUs) in the traffic network, and the original message to be transmitted by the vehicle is mes. Let p be a prime number. Select an additive group G 1 of order p with a generator g 1 and a multiplicative cyclic group G 2 of order p with a generator g 2 . Groups G 1 , G 2 are both difficult to solve for the bilinear pairing inversion problem (BPIP) [44] . Choose a bilinear pair e: G 1 × G 1 → G 2 and three one-way hash functions:
For the OBUs, suppose that each vehicle owner reviews the vehicle owner's information and registers the vehicle information when the owner buys it. The information (vehicle frame number, license plate number, vehicle owner, etc.) are stored in the ID authentication library in TA. TA will select a random number as a safety OBU parameter to generate a key pair. TA will bind OBU identity information with its security parameter and write it into the OBU tamper-resistant equipment.
For RSUs, there is a fundamental difference between RSUs and OBUs. Firstly, RSU privacy requirements are not high, so the registration process is slightly different. However, it still needs to register with TA. TA allocates an identity RSU_ID to the RSU and the ID does not change after registration. TA will select a random number as a RSU safety parameter to generate a key pair. The identity ID and security parameter are bound and saved by the TA and written into the RSU.
Assume each member has completed the registration with TA. TA will release system parameters within a certain period of time. The parameters a, b ∈ R Z p are chosen randomly from Z p and b is only known to the TA. And its public key is
TA publishes the system parameters to the network:
KGEN: Generate a key pair for each node (including OBUs and RSUs in the network) in the key space.
For OBUs, assume that the member ID is car_ID i and the corresponding public key is
where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. TA generates the member's private key based on the set parameters.
For RSUs, assume that the member ID is RSU_ID i and the corresponding public key is
TA generates the member's private key based on the set parameters.
Then the public key ring in the traffic network topology is
ENCRYPT: An OBU encrypts a message mes and transmits it in the network.
Take t ∈ R Z p and calculate
T = e (T , pwd) = e (t 0 g 1 , pwd)
Take message ∈ M and assume
Then encrypted message of the original message mes is
SIGN: OBU uses its own P r and the public key ring L to sign the encrypted message mes . Choose Q ∈ G 1 and calculate
Then bilinear pair value C i+1 is expressed as
where S N ∈ G 1 is selected according to the order N = i + 1, i + 2, . . . , n − 1, 0, 1, . . . , i − 1 and N is the value of modulo n.
Supposes S 0 = S n and calculate
We can get output signature
VER: Upon receiving the encrypted message and ring signature, the node in the traffic network will first verify the security and integrity of the message. It will not accept the message until it passes the verification.
Enter the encrypted message mes , the public key ring L, ring signature σ and calculate
If the equation is established, the signature is valid and is accepted by the receiver. Otherwise, the signature is rejected.
DECRYPT: After receiving the encrypted message mes , the receiver decrypts mes using PWD from the TA to obtain the original message.
It can obtain the original message by the following formula
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION A. SECURITY ASSESSMENT
Communication security and privacy protection are vital requirements in VANETs. In this section we assess the proposed DPRS algorithm in the following four parts: (i) correctness; (ii) anonymity; (iii) unforgeability; (iv) and receiving security.
the improved DPRS algorithm satisfies the verification equation, so the verification algorithm is correct and valid.
2) ANONYMITY ASSESSMENT
In the SIGN algorithm, in accordance with the order choice of N = i + 1, i + 2, . . . , n − 1, 0, 1, . . . , i − 1, S N is evenly selected. C N is generated in (14) . Q ∈ G 1 is randomly selected. So C is uniformly distributed in G 2 . In this way, the signature σ has the same probability for each node whichever node initiates DPRS. Therefore, the probability of any attacker succeeding in calculating the true signer's identity from a given signature does not exceed 1/n.
3) UNFORGEABILITY ASSESSMENT
The attackers are divided into two types. Imagine attackers Attact_I and Attact_II want to forge a ring signature σ = (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n , S). If attacker Attact_I randomly selects σ = (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n , S) and calculates with the formula (18) . Its equivalent equation is
Making
we get
where
Then it is a BPIP problem [44] . Since we previously assumed that the BPIP problem was intractable, the attacker could not succeed. If attacker Attact_II randomly selects σ = (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n , S) and calculates with (18) .
Its equivalent equation is
The above equation contains a hash function calculation, solving the equation is difficult. Therefore, C N (i = k) is also difficult to solve.
Attact_II uses arbitrary P r ∈ G 1 to express the private key P ri of the signer in (15) . Among it, S 0 = S n does not pass the signatures for (18).
4) RECEIVING SECURITY ASSESSMENT
For the message sender, it is not allowed that any node can receive the published message. For the attacker Attact_III trying to spy on privacy, even if it can get through the RS, it can only obtain the encrypted signaturemes . We can infer that Attact_III also need to get PWD from TA. However, this process requires TA to verify the identity of the Attact_III, then it is certain that Attact_III is not registered in the TA ID library and it cannot be verified. In consequence, Attact_III cannot decrypt the mes through (19). 
B. COMMUNICATION EFFCIENCY ASSESSMENT
In the signature generation phase-SIGN, the calculation of the improved scheme is roughly the same as the original scheme. However, in the verification phase-VER, the bilinear pairings of the improved scheme are only 2 times, compared with 2n times in the original scheme. As for computational complexity, in the improved scheme, the complexity of addition in G 1 is O (1) in SIGN, and the computational complexity of linear pair is O (1) in VER, whereas in the original one, the computational complexity is O (n). In a word, the improved scheme is more efficient.
C. RING PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT
In the Unix operating system, the network simulation tool NS2 version 2.35 is used to simulate the improved DPRS algorithm in an mock traffic environment. Based on the parameter settings in Table 4 , we simulate a 500-meterlong intersection within 200 seconds for further abstraction and simplification. It is assumed that vehicle nodes will be randomly generated and RSU nodes are fixedly distributed on the roadside throughout the simulation. According to the agreement 802.11p, VC range is 500 meters.
The anonymous set is fixed at 3. We mainly compare looping delay and looping probability between RSU-assisted looping and standard-looping. The simulation node enters the road from one side, but the OBUs travel in both directions at random. And it can be assumed that the numbers of vehicles in opposite directions are substantially same. Vehicle speed is randomly generated over a range of 50-100 km/h.
The test equipment is shown in Table 5 . The effect of the vehicle number on ring efficiency is shown in Fig. 3 . From the result, it can be seen that the improved algorithm has a higher ring probability than the standard-looping. When the vehicle threshold reaches a certain value, the two one will be nearly equal.
As the number of vehicles increases, the ring probability increases in both algorithms, and the standard one grows faster.
In the RSU assisted looping strategy, when the vehicle number reaches a certain threshold, the probability growth line is close to a smooth line. From the above preliminary simulation experiments and simulation data, it is clear that the RSU-assisted looping scheme improves the ring probability in high-speed driving. 
V. TEST VERIFICATION A. INTRODUCE OF TEST FACILITIES
First, we conducted the test site design based on the system construction of VANETs, and introduce the test area and the test equipment. Then the test data is displayed and the performance of the DPRS algorithm is analyzed.
For the security of VANETs, the construction of VANETs security system is divided into three parts, namely, infrastructure construction, fusion integration and intelligent defense, as shown in Fig. 4 . In addition to the theoretical verification of the improved DPRS, we also carried out a real car test at the Chang'an University test field.
In the test, we use four cars and a variety of RSUs, including multiple base stations, traffic lights, simulated tunnels, gantry, and electronic toll collection (ETC). Some RSUs are depicted in Fig. 5 .
We conducted experiments on both straight roads and crossroads. Fig. 6 shows the test areas.
Ring signature node traffic network in the test area includes OBUs and RSUs. Based on Fig. 6 (a) , OBUs are marked red and RSUs are marked blue in Fig. 7 . The number of RSUs in the test area is at least 15, which is enough to carry out the ring signature within the coverage area of 1000 meters radius of the base station.
B. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISION OF TEST RESULTS
The RSUs have a communication range of 1000 meters. The distance between OBUs is at least 5 meters. The traffic network has a usable bandwidth of 10 Mbps. Each OBU within the RSUs range issues a traffic-related message periodically every 100 to 300 ms to the traffic network. Data obtained from the test is shown in Table 6 . After the test, we investigated the performance of the protocol. In general, when traffic networks and the number of nodes are constant, more messages cause longer communication delay. Longer distance between the node and the access router also causes longer communication delay. The average delay for secure communications is 100 ms. Other performance indexes are shown in the following graphs.
In the test, we first set n = 10, four test cars and six RSUs. We set the speed to a fixed low speed range, v = 0-6 m/s. When setting different system parameter k in the test, the communication time after releasing a message is as shown in Fig. 8 .
In Fig. 8 , we can see that when the ring signature node number and speed range are certain, the signature time, verification time, the total communication time increases with the increase of system parameters, i.e., communication delay increases. This is the expected result. In the hash function, H 1 : {0, 1} * → Z k p , the system parameter k represents the length of the message bit string. In the signature algorithm, the larger the system parameter k is, the larger the number of generated key pair columns and the calculation are, and the longer the communication time is. Fig.9 is a comparison map of communication time under different DPRS nodes. Under different system parameters, we can see that when there are more nodes, the number of vector rows of the generated key pair is the larger and the communication time is the longer. Then we consider the effect of the OBU speed on the communication time with the same DPRS node number and the system parameter. We set n = 10. OBU speed is divided into three different speed ranges: 0-6 m/s, 6-12 m/s, and 12-24 km/h. Speed can vary randomly within the range.
As shown in Fig. 10 (a) -(b) , the influence of OBU speed on signature time, verification time and total time is very small. Overall, with the same node number and the system parameter k, the signature time, verification time and total time become longer as the OBU speed increases.
Additionally, to make a fair comparison, we set the same speed range v = 0-6 km/h and the same node number n = 10, and compare the communication time between the improved DPRS and the protocol in [11] . Fig. 11 schematically illustrates that the signature time T 1 , the verification time T 2 , and the total time T increase with the increase of the system parameter k in the DPRS and the protocol in [11] . When the same number messages are transmitted, the communication time of DPRS is reduced and communication efficiency is improved compared to the protocol in [11] . When multiple messages are transmitted at the same time, the communication efficiency increases more clearly, as shown in Fig. 12 .
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we propose a DPRS mechanism in VANETs to ensure double protection of communications. Two major innovations are introduced in DPRS. First, a secure communication transmission system is proposed to prevent messages from being intercepted by anyone not in the signature ring. Second, two algorithms, ENCRYPT and DECRYPT, are used to encrypt and decrypt the message. Then we conduct a safety assessment of DPRS on correctness, communication efficiency and ring probability. Finally, we conducted actual vehicle tests in actual test sites with VANETs.
Test data and analysis show that the DPRS mechanism can meet our pre-set dual communication protection. When the vehicle is in the low speed range, smaller system parameter k produces higher communication efficiency. The number of DPRS nodes also affects the communication time, but the impact is small. In general, DPRS outperforms the protocol in [11] in terms of communication efficiency and security in the same speed range and the same hardware environment.
In summary, DPRS can protect both communication security and privacy in the VANETs. It also improves the communication efficiency. However, the application of DPRS in the ring probability and communication efficiency still needs further study. 
